This workshop has now taken place. The report can be downloaded here.
This workshop will ask the following key questions:
1) Does the individuation of the senses matter for scientific, philosophical, or everyday explanation of sensory and multisensory processes? If so, when?
2) Is the idea of individuation linked to modular-type of explanations which are in decline? What would be wrong with a distinction of the senses just by receptors or types of processes?
3) What are the proximal / distal and interoception / exteroception distinctions and are they useful?
4) Is the only real problem that of how conscious experiences should be classified into distinct kinds? Are there five, or a limited number of distinct phenomenal or representational kinds of experience? Could the alleged categories be explained just by positing different judgements? Can we however describe the nature of what are taken to be cross-modal phenomena, like the McGurk effect, without the idea that one kind of experience (visual) affects another kind of experience (auditory)?